The Mail Fraud Statute: An Argument for
Repeal by Implication
Todd E. Molzt
Think twice next time you drop a letter in the mail: you may
be committing a crime. The federal mail fraud statute' captures
almost every form of deceptive behavior that uses the mail,2 so if
you have ever lied in a letter to get money or property, it's time
to turn yourself in. You could be sentenced to five years in a federal prison and a fine.3
The expansive language of the mail fraud statute creates its
broad reach. The text of the statute makes it a crime for anyone
"having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," to use the
mail or a private carrier.4 Thus, the statute reaches far beyond
the simple "fraud" that its name suggests to encompass any attempts to use the mail to obtain money or property by deception.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the statute is not limited to the definition of common law fraud,5 a definition that is itself extremely broad.'
t B.A. 1994, Middlebury College; J.D. Candidate 1997, The University of Chicago.
' 18 USC § 1341 (1994 & Supp 1996). This Comment's discussion of mail fraud applies equally to the wire fraud statute, 18 USC § 1343 (1994 & Supp 1996). The two statutes are almost identical, the primary difference being that jurisdiction under the mail
fraud statute is triggered when a person uses the mail system or a private carrier, while
the wire fraud statute applies when a person "transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice ....
See 18 USC § 1343.
' See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am
Crim L Rev 117, 119 (1981) (citing jury instruction, upheld by the D.C. Circuit, that
"seems to equate dishonesty with the criminal offense of mail fraud"). See also Post v
United States, 407 F2d 319, 329 (DC Cir 1968) (Jury instruction correctly defined purposeful breach of a fiduciary duty as a type of dishonesty covered by the mail fraud statute.).
' 18 USC § 1341. See also Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 USC §§ 2C1.7, 2F1.1
(1994).
4 18 USC § 1341.
Durland v United States, 161 US 306, 312-13 (1896) (addressing and rejecting the
argument that the statute is limited to the reach of common law "false pretenses").
' See Weiss v United States, 122 F2d 675, 681 (5th Cir 1941) ("The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human inge-
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Courts 7 and commentators' alike have expressed concern
about the comprehensive scope of the mail fraud statute. Two
fundamental problems flow from the statute's breadth. First,
prosecutors, aided by courts, use the statute to fill gaps in the
criminal law left by Congress,9 despite the Constitution's declaration that "all legislative powers" therein granted are vested in
the Congress. ° Second, the statute fails to provide citizens with
adequate notice as to what conduct it outlaws. One of the basic
principles of the rule of law is that the state must provide clear
notice of the illegality of a course of action before depriving an
individual of his liberty."
Courts have disregarded numerous commentators' proposals
to limit the mail fraud statute. 2 Courts have properly ignored
nuity."); Joseph Story, 1 Equity Jurisprudence§ 187 at 199 (Little, Brown 11th ed 1873)
("raud... includes all acts... which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty... and
[which] are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another.") (citations omitted).
' See Emery v American GeneralFinance,Inc, 71 F3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir 1995) ('The
language of the mail-fraud statute is very broad, and concern has repeatedly been expressed that it not be given too vague and encompassing a scope by judicial interpretation.") (citations omitted); United States v Barta, 635 F2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir 1980) ("[Wle
are asked to construe two seemingly limitless provisions, the mail and wire fraud statutes.") (footnotes omitted).
' See, for example, Coffee, 19 Am Crim L Rev at 126-28 (cited in note 2) ("In light of
the inherent overbreadth of [the] prevailing interpretation of mail and wire fraud statutes, it is hardly surprising that several recent commentators have raised the spectre of
overcriminalization."); Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A
Legislative Approach, 20 Am Crim L Rev 423, 424-26 (1983) (observing that the statute
"has been expansively interpreted to invite federal prosecution of virtually every type of
untoward activity known to man") (citations omitted).
' Coffee, 19 Am Crim L Rev at 126 (cited in note 2) ("Among prosecutors, a wellknown maxim says 'when in doubt, charge mail fraud.'"). See also Dan M. Kahan, Is
Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?, 110 Harv L Rev 469, 480 (1996) (Courts' current
treatment of statutes such as the mail fraud statute "effectively transfers delegated lawmaking authority to individual prosecutors.").
10 US Const, Art I, § 1.
1' See United States v Batchelder, 442 US 114, 123 (1979), quoting Lanzetta v New
Jersey, 306 US 451, 453 (1939) ("It is a fundamental tenet of due process that '[no] one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes."); United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 617 (1954) (A criminal statute must
"give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.").
' Many critics of the mail fraud statute argue for a legislative response. See Ellen S.
Podgor, Mail Fraud:Opening Letters, 43 SC L Rev 223, 269 (1992) ("This restructuring [of
the mail fraud statute] needs to be an action of our legislature, as opposed to the judiciary."); Coffee, 19 Am Crim L Rev at 166-72 (cited in note 2) (calling for a legislative response to the rapid change in the meaning of the federal fraud statutes); Hurson, 20 Am
Crim L Rev at 457-58 (cited in note 8) (proposing a specific definition of "scheme to defraud" for Congress to insert in the mail fraud statute); and Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail
Fraudand the IntangibleRights Doctrine:Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 Harv J Leg 153,
200-01 (1994) (proposing a new mail fraud statute). Independent of their relative merits,
these suggestions all suffer from one fatal defect: Congress will never rein in the mail

1997]

Mail Fraud

these proposals because the commentators mistakenly suggest
limiting the statute's scope by providing a positive theory of mail
fraud.13 To define the limits of mail fraud, however, would destroy the statute's ability to adapt and thereby capture new
forms of fraud.1 4 This adaptability is important because crime assumes many forms, criminals can find and exploit statutory
loopholes, and Congress has limited resources with which to
draft, debate, and enact criminal statutes. 5 Indeed, the broad
language of the mail fraud statute allows courts to adapt the
statute to new forms of fraud, thereby deterring criminals from
finding and exploiting loopholes and, by delegating lawmaking
power to courts, lowering the cost of legislating for Congress. 6
At this point, it is important to distinguish "good" gapflling
from "bad" gapfilling. Broad statutes such as the mail fraud statute enable prosecutors and courts to fill gaps in the criminal law.
Such gapfilling is good when the illicit activity is a new form of
fraud that Congress has yet to consider. For example, before
Congress passed the credit card fraud statute, prosecutors and
courts used the mail fraud statute to prosecute such fraud. As
Chief Justice Burger noted, the mail fraud statute acts as a
"stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until [Congress can pass] particularized legislation."
This form of gapfilling improves criminal law because it deters
criminals from engaging in illicit behavior and enables courts to
block new forms of fraud quickly and easily.
In contrast, "bad" gapfilling occurs when prosecutors and
courts use the mail fraud statute to fill gaps in existing statutes,
undermining the congressional judgment embodied in those
statutory gaps. Once Congress has passed "particularized legislation," the mail fraud statute is no longer needed to act as a stopgap. Suppose Congress enacts a credit card statute with a requirement that the fraud be for at least five thousand dollars.
Congress has made a specific judgment that credit card fraud for
fraud statute because it wants to preserve its status as a gapfiller. See text accompanying
notes 99-102.
" A positive theory of mail fraud attempts to define mail fraud in terms of a limited
set of prohibited activities. In contrast, this Comment defines mail fraud only in negative
terms, that is, what conduct is not covered. See text accompanying notes 112-25.
" John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Scope of the
"Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 Am Crim L Rev 1, 27 (1983) ("The practical
strength of the mail fraud statute is also its conceptual weakness.").
IS Kahan, 110 Harv L Rev at 474-75 (cited in note 9).
"Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev 343, 377.
But see United States v Hudson and Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (Congress
alone has the power to create criminal law.).
"' United States v Maze, 414 US 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger dissenting).
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amounts below five thousand dollars does not merit the attention
of federal authorities. But if a prosecutor now elects to prosecute
a case of credit card fraud involving three hundred dollars under
the mail fraud statute, she has undone that congressional judgment. She has used the mail fraud statute to fill a statutory gap
intentionally created by Congress. Such gapfilling is bad because
it blocks the ability of Congress to place certain conduct beyond
the reach of federal criminal law.
This Comment seeks to preserve the strength of the mail
fraud statute-its ability to reach new forms of fraud-while
mitigating its weaknesses by using a tool of statutory interpretation: repeal by implication. When Congress passes a criminal
statute governing a particular form of conduct, such as credit
card fraud, repeal by implication dictates that the mail fraud
statute has been implicitly repealed for cases of credit card fraud.
Repeal by implication does not depend upon a positive theory
of mail fraud in order to limit the mail fraud statute. Instead, it
utilizes subsequent statutes to define what mail fraud is not.
This restraint would allow the mail fraud statute to continue to
adapt to and capture new forms of fraud, but would also create
pockets in the criminal law governed exclusively by subsequent
statutes. Repeal by implication is superior to current approaches
to the mail fraud statute because it would reduce the cost to
Congress of stopping prosecutors from bad gapfilling, restrict judicial and prosecutorial discretion, enhance notice of proscribed
criminal conduct, and preserve the mail fraud statute as a gapfiller.
Part I of this Comment reviews four cases: the first three
cases illustrate the incoherence of the current approach to the
mail fraud statute; the last case then illustrates one court's attempt to apply repeal by implication. Part II argues that courts
fundamentally misunderstand the mail fraud statute, creating
the confusion in the current law. Part III first makes the case for
repeal by implication and addresses how to determine the scope
of an implicit repeal; it then concludes by examining the caselaw
and demonstrating that it accommodates repeal by implication.
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO TE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
This Part analyzes four cases to show how courts apply the
mail fraud statute. Each of the first three cases highlights different defects in the current approach. The first case illustrates how
courts allow prosecutors to use the mail fraud statute to ignore
Congress's considered judgment in enacting criminal statutes.
The second case shows how the current approach creates sense-
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less inconsistency in federal criminal law. The third case reveals
the current approach's inability to generate clear precedent for
lower courts. Together, these three cases demonstrate the incoherence of the current approach to the mail fraud statute. The final case illustrates an insightful application of the repeal by implication approach.
A. Ignoring Congress's Considered Judgment
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Dowling v United
States 8 offers a powerful argument for deferring to Congress's
considered judgment. In the lower court, the defendant had been
convicted of violating both the mail fraud statute and the National Stolen Property Act 9 for the sale and shipment of illegally
bootlegged audiotapes. The Supreme Court, however, threw out
the conviction under the National Stolen Property Act on the
grounds that the broader criminal statute did not apply when
there existed a more specific statute that established a more refined, less onerous penalty structure," in this case the Copyright
Act.2 Despite the Court's own holding, the mail fraud convictions
were never questioned.
The Court made a strong argument for relying exclusively on
the more specific statute. It pointed out that "the history of the
criminal infringement provisions of the Copyright Act reveals a
good deal of care on Congress' part before subjecting copyright infringement to serious criminal penalties."" To apply the National
Stolen Property Act would "presume[ ] congressional adoption of
an indirect but blunderbuss solution to a problem treated with
precision when considered directly [by Congress] ."2'
The Court never addressed the mail fraud convictions,2 4
leaving one to wonder why the argument against application of
the National Stolen Property Act should not also preclude application of the mail fraud statute. Like the National Stolen Property Act, the mail fraud statute imposes serious criminal penalties, and is a "blunderbuss solution," in that it offers an unrefined penalty structure. Further, it overrides the careful and considered structure of the Copyright Act. Yet despite the striking
473 US 207 (1985).
,18 USC § 2314 (1994).
Dowling, 473 US at 227-29.
2. 17 USC § 506(a) (1994).
Dowling, 473 US at 225.
2Id
at 226.
2 For unidentified reasons, the Court was concerned only with the charges under the
National Stolen Property Act. Id at 209 n 1.
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similarities between the mail fraud statute and the National
Stolen Property Act, the Court never questioned the application
of the mail fraud statute. This omission is strange, for the
Court's own reasoning suggests that the statute undermines
Congress's "carefully considered approach"25 to copyright law.
B. Senseless Inconsistency in Federal Criminal Law
United States v Bryan26 illustrates how the current approach
to the mail fraud statute leads to senseless inconsistency in federal criminal law. In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory of liability under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.27 Misappropriation theory imposes criminal liability on someone who trades on material nonpublic information that he gained by breaching a duty.2" The court rejected
this theory because the theory failed to provide clear notice regarding the conduct it outlawed and thus created amorphous liability. The court reasoned that such amorphous liability would
severely impair securities markets. It noted that "[t]he Supreme
the securities market deCourt has repeatedly emphasized that
30
mands certainty and predictability."

In spite of this emphasis on the need for certainty in capital
markets, however, the Bryan court proceeded to find the defendant guilty under the equally amorphous mail fraud statute.3
This result is strikingly incongruous. If the Fourth Circuit
rejected misappropriation theory because of its potential to chill
the fragile securities market, it should have rejected mail fraud
for the very same reason. Broad and uncertain liability standards
chill conduct-regardless of the statutory source. The Bryan
court recognized this contradiction, but, strangely, was "not especially concerned with any inconsistency in the scope of fraud prohibited by these various statutes." 2

Id at 225.
58 F3d 933 (4th Cir 1995).
15 USC § 78j(b) (1994).
The Bryan court stated that misappropriation theory finds insider trading liability
when someone: "(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching a
duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in
a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders
of the traded stock." 58 F3d at 944 (citations omitted).
Id at 950-51.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
- Id at 939-43.
2 Id at 952.
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C. The Inability to Generate Useful Precedent
In United States v Maze, the Supreme Court reached the
right result, but for the wrong reasons." Since the case involved
an area of conduct governed by a statute enacted after the mail
fraud statute, the Court had an opportunity to invoke repeal by
implication. Unfortunately, the Court followed the current approach to the mail fraud statute and, in so doing, offered little or
no guidance to lower courts.
Maze stole his roommate's credit card and charged $301.85
on it.3 4 Because the credit card fraud statute only reached frauds
involving $5,000 or more,3 5 the federal prosecutor could only
charge Maze with mail fraud. 6 The prosecutor argued that Maze
had violated the mail fraud statute because he had devised a
scheme to defraud and "knew that each merchant would cause
the sales slips of the purchases to be delivered by mail to the [ ]
bank which would in turn mail them to [his roommate] for payment." In addition, the prosecutor argued that the inherent delay of the mailings was essential to the success of Maze's
scheme."
The Supreme Court raised the standard for liability under
the mail fraud statute to overturn Maze's convictions. It held
that to violate the mail fraud statute, the mailing must be "for
the purpose of executing the scheme,... but it is not necessary
that . . . the use of the mails [be] an essential element [of the
scheme].""9 In this case, the Court ruled, the mailings were not
for the purpose of executing the scheme because the mailings actually "increased the probability that [he] would be detected and
apprehended."" As for the government's claim that the delay in
the mailings led to the scheme's success, the Court stated that it
was the distance, not the postal system, that caused the delay.4
By narrowing the scope of the mail fraud statute in this manner,
the Court missed a perfect opportunity to invoke repeal by implication. 2
414 US 395 (1974).
Id at 396, 402 n 6.

15 USC § 1644 (1976).
Maze, 414 US at 396.
Id at 397.
Id.
Id at 400-01, quoting Kann v United States, 323 US 88, 94 (1944) and Pereira v
United States, 347 US 1, 8 (1947) (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added).
'" Maze, 414 US at 403.
41 Id ("IT]he distance, and

not the mail service,. . . cause[d] the time lag in the physical transmission of such correspondence.") (citations omitted).
', The Supreme Court's approach in Maze stands in sharp contrast with the Court of
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Maze reveals yet another defect in the current approach: the
Supreme Court's ad hoc method of interpreting the mail fraud
statute. As the Court can decide only a few cases each year, it is
critical that it provide clear guidance to lower courts. Yet shortly
after the Court reversed the Maze conviction by requiring that
the mails be used for the "purpose of executing the scheme," it
replaced the Maze standard with a more lax requirement in
Schmuck v United States." Because the Court rarely provides definitive guidance, prosecutors and defendants can cite multiple
cases supporting their view of what satisfies the mailing elements of the mail fraud statute." While this defect alone may not
be cause for alarm, when coupled with the other problems identified in this Part, it exposes the incoherence of the current approach.
Contrast this result with what would have happened if the
Supreme Court had ruled that the credit card statute implicitly
repealed the mail fraud statute. Lower courts would not apply
the mail fraud statute to credit card fraud, a substantial limitation on the mail fraud statute would be in place, and the statute's
gapfiller status would be preserved.

Appeals's approach. The Sixth Circuit observed that Congress had passed specific legislation governing credit card fraud, and concluded that courts should respect the judgments
embodied in that statute: "[B]y establishing a jurisdictional floor of $5,000 in the statute,
Congress appears to have decided to make the aggravated misuse of credit cards, e.g., by
organized criminals, a federal offense and to leave to local prosecution the casual or mcidental misuse." United States v Maze, 468 F2d 529, 536 (6th Cir 1972), affd, 414 US 395
(1973). The Sixth Circuit, had it stopped here, would have offered an excellent example of
repeal by implication. Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit added the qualification "unless the
offender makes a purposeful use of the mails to accomplish his scheme." Id. Believing the
purposeful use of the mails to be a meaningful statutory requirement, the lower court
thus mistakenly focused on the same issue as the Supreme Court.
489 US 705, 713 (1989) (mailing of registration forms found to be central to the
long-term success of an odometer scam). Schmuck continued the Supreme Court's vacillation on the rigor of this requirement. See also Kann, 323 US at 95 (The mail fraud statute
reaches "only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud."); Pereira,347 US at 8 (mailing need not be essential to the scheme,
only incidental) (citations omitted); Parrv United States, 363 US 370, 392-93 (1960)
(mailing of tax forms and credit card bill irrelevant to the success of the scheme, and
therefore does not satisfy mailing requirement); and United States v Sampson, 371 US
75, 80-81 (1962) (mailing after the perpetrators had received the money fulfilled the
mailing requirement). See generally Matthew J. Effken, Note, The Mailing Element of the
FederalMail Fraud Statute: Schmuck v. United States, 23 Creighton L Rev 97 (1990)
(detailing courts' vacillation).
"See United States v Walters, 997 F2d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir 1993) ("[Ilt is no surprise
that each side to [a] case can cite several of our decisions in support [of its view as to
whether a mailing is for the purpose of committing a scheme to defraud].").
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D. A Case Study
The insightful opinion in United States v Henderson illuminates a superior alternative to the current approach.45 In
Henderson, the district court effectively employed repeal by implication to hold that the mail fraud statute is preempted by the
more specific tax fraud statute.46 The court recognized that the
mail fraud statute is a gapfiller and also that Congress had
passed a subsequent statute to govern the issue at hand.47 Therefore, the Henderson court found "no need to use the mail fraud
statute as a stopgap device until particularized legislation is enacted to deal directly with the evil."4"
Unfortunately, Henderson rarely persuades other courts.
Two principal objections to the approach of the Henderson court
have arisen, both of which break down under close examination.
The first objection is that a subsequent statute does not indicate
congressional intent to repeal an earlier statute. The search for
intent, however, asks the wrong question. The issue is not
whether "Congress has the right to authorize additional sanctions for abuse of the mails,"" or even whether there was

"Congressional intent to create a hierarchy of sanctions that
would preempt the applications of the mail fraud statute."0 No
one doubts Congress's power to do the former, and if the latter
were true, there would be express repeal. The relevant question is
how to construe silence. Construing silence to mean implicit repeal minimizes the cost to Congress of exempting conduct from
criminality.
The second attack on Henderson is that sometimes Congress
intends for two criminal statutes to govern the same conduct.
Courts voicing this opinion rely on United States v Batchelder.5
In Batchelder, the defendant had been convicted of violating 18
USC § 922(h), which prohibits a felon from receiving a firearm
that has traveled through interstate commerce.52 The defendant
was sentenced to five years in accordance with 18 USC § 924."3
386 F Supp 1048 (S D NY 1974). See also Ellen S. Podgor, Tax Fraud-MailFraud:
Synonymous, Cumulative or Diverse?, 57 U Cin L Rev 903 (1989) (discussing Henderson
and related cases).
" 386 F Supp at 1053-54.

4' Id.
"Id (internal quotations omitted).
" United States v Weatherspoon, 581 F2d 595, 600 (7th Cir 1978).
Id at 599.
442 US 114 (1979). See also UnitedStates v Simon, 510 F Supp 232, 236-37 (E D Pa
1981).
" 442 US at 116.
63Id.
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An alternate statutory provision, 18 USC § 1202(a), was identical
to § 922 as applied to a convicted felon who unlawfully received a
firearm.' This alternate provision provided for a maximum sentence of two years.5 The defendant argued that this overlap
meant that § 1202 implicitly repealed § 924.5"
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. 7 It relied heavily on the fact that the scope of these two statutes was unambiguous; these were fully specified statutes. 5 Moreover, the legislative history of the statutes explicitly recognized the overlapping provisions.5 9
Batchelder is completely unlike cases involving the mail
fraud statute. First, because it involved specific statutes, there
was no danger of lack of notice, and therefore no tension with
rule of law values. Second, Congress had explicitly considered
dual enforcement." In the mail fraud context, however, Congress
likely did not consider such dual application of the subsequent
statute and the mail fraud statute." Thus, Batchelder should not
apply to cases involving the mail fraud statute.
This Part has shown the incoherence of the current approach
to the mail fraud statute, as exemplified by the first three cases,
and contrasted it with the superior results obtained by repeal by
implication, as exemplified by Henderson. The next Part attempts to diagnose the problem plaguing current law.
II.

TE MISUNDERSTOOD MAIL FRAUD STATUTE

The central premise of this Comment is that courts fundamentally misunderstand the mail fraud statute. This misunderstanding manifests itself in the form of courts adopting two in18 USC § 1202(a) (1994).
SId.
Batchelder,442 US at 117.
Id at 123.
Id. Specified statutes regulate a clearly delineated set of activities and require
courts only to act as Congress's agents in enforcing them; they differ from general statutes, such as the mail fraud statute, that regulate an undefined range of activities and
require courts to "make law" in defining their scope.
Id at 120-21.
17

o Id at 119.

It would have been generally impossible for Congress to consider the subsequent
statute when it passed the mail fraud statute. At the time of the passage of the mail
fraud statute, many of the forms of fraud now captured by that statute were inconceivable. See Henderson, 386 F Supp at 1052 ("Realistically, it is somewhat of a fiction to
speak of whether Congress 'intended' the mail fraud statute to apply to [tax fraud]."). See
also text accompanying notes 64-66. Congress intends that the mail fraud statute act as a
"stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until [it can develop and pass] particularized legislation. .. ." United States v Maze, 414 US 395, 405-06
(1974) (Burger dissenting).
61
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consistent stances when asked to interpret the mail fraud statute. When asked to expand the reach of the mail fraud statute to
capture some new form of fraud, they willingly make new law in
the guise of "interpreting" the mail fraud statute. In contrast,
courts mistakenly retreat to the role of Congress's agent when
asked to restrict the mail fraud statute. This schizophrenic
treatment of the statute has resulted in ever-expanding, nevercontracting liability.
Statutes come in two varieties, calling on courts to play two
different roles: specified statutes, which require courts to act
simply as passive agents of Congress, and unspecified statutes,
such as the mail fraud statute, that effectively enlist courts in
making law.62 Since its inception, the mail fraud statute has been
broad, and every substantive congressional amendment to it has
further broadened its scope.' This breadth has enabled courts to
create new crimes based upon the statute. For example, prior to
the passage of the 1933 Securities Act, courts used the mail fraud
statute to capture securities fraud." Similarly, courts have extended the mail fraud statute to credit card fraud65 and tax
fraud.' Yet courts-so ready to make law when augmenting the
mail fraud statute-suddenly become dutiful, humble congressional agents when asked to restrict it and claim that "nothing
...reflect[s] any Congressional intent... [to] preempt the application of the mail fraud statute." 7 This dual treatment of the
mail fraud statute makes it increasingly expansive.

' See Kahan, 1994 S Ct Rev at 351-56 (cited in note 16) (showing how broad statutes
act as implicit delegations to courts to make law). See also Chevron USA Inc v NRDC,
467 US 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that courts will defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes). The Sherman Act is the paradigm example of the latter type
of statute. See 15 USC §§ 1 et seq (1994); National Society of Professional Engineers v
United States, 435 US 679, 688 (1978) (citations omitted) (recognizing that Congress effectively asked courts to create a common law of antitrust).
' Some criminals evaded the reach of the mail fraud statute by using private carriers. Because by its terms the statute covered only the United States postal system, Congress had to act to reach this particular form of evasion. See generally Peter J. Henning,
Maybe It Should Just Be Called FederalFraud: The ChangingNature of the Mail Fraud
Statute, 36 BC L Rev 435, 476 (1995) (detailing the passage of the provision to reach
those who use private carriers). See also Jed S. Rakoff, The FederalMail Statute (PartI),
18 Duquesne L Rev 771 (1980).
"Arthur F. Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and
Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 Geo Wash L
Rev 901, 911 (1971) (citations omitted). See, for example, United States v Brown, 5 F
Supp 81 (S D NY 1933).
UnitedStates v Kelem, 416 F2d 346, 350 (9th Cir 1969).
UnitedStates v Mangan, 575 F2d 32, 48-49 (2d Cir 1978).
UnitedStates v Weatherspoon, 581 F2d 595, 599 (7th Cir 1978).
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A. A Delegation of Lawmaking Powers to Courts
The congressional response to McNally v United States offers
strong evidence of Congress's desire that courts treat the mail
fraud statute as a delegation of lawmaking power.68 In McNally,
the Supreme Court, invoking the rule of lenity, created a theory
of mail fraud in order to limit the scope of the mail fraud statute.69 The Court found that "the original impetus behind the mail
fraud statute was to protect the people from schemes to deprive
them of their money or property,"7" and thus rejected the view
that the statute covered deprivations of honest services.
Justice Stevens recognized that the Court's holding was inconsistent with the mail fraud statute's role as a gapfiller. He
wrote that the "mail fraud statute [was] written in broad language on the understanding that the courts would have wide latitude in construing [it] to achieve the remedial purposes that
Congress had identified."7' In other words, the Court's majority
opinion destroyed the most important attribute of the mail fraud
statute: its ability to adapt and capture new forms of fraud.
Congress agreed with Justice Stevens. It legislatively overturned McNally with 18 USC § 1346, restoring the law to its
status before the decision. 2 More importantly, Congress sent a

" Some would object that courts should always confine themselves to the role of
agent. Anyone who seriously believes this should advocate striking down the mail fraud
statute as overbroad. No principled distinction can be drawn between delegated lawmaking in expanding the mail fraud statute-which courts currently do-and delegated
lawmaking in restricting it-which courts refuse to do. Moreover, many criminal laws
generally would be unconstitutional. Yet few have argued that the mail fraud statute is
unconstitutional, and the day for that argument has passed. See Badders v United States,
240 US 391, 393-94 (1916) (finding the mail fraud statute constitutional). For the argument that it is unconstitutional, see Moohr, 31 Harv J Leg at 187-99 (cited in note 12).
0 483 US 350, 359-60 (1987). See also United States v Bass, 404 US 336, 347 (1971)
("[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity ....
[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what Congress has
made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.") (citations omitted).
10McNally, 483 US at 356. If the Court were serious about limiting the scope of the
mail fraud statute to Congress's intent at the time of passage, then the statute would be
much narrower indeed. It would not reach many of the kinds of conduct the statute currently outlaws. See text accompanying notes 62-66. For example, the mail fraud statute
could cover neither tax fraud nor credit card fraud, because neither existed at that time.
The Court explicitly rejected the argument respecting credit card fraud in Maze: "The
mail fraud statute, first enacted in 1872,... while obviously not directed at credit card
frauds as such, is sufficiently general in its language to include them if the requirements
of the statute are otherwise met." 414 US at 399 n 4.
71 McNally, 483 US at 372-73 (Stevens dissenting).
' See 18 USC § 1346 (1994) ("For purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services.").
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strong signal to the courts not to hinder the mail fraud statute's
capacity as the "first line of defense."73
McNally reveals that Congress intends the broad language of
the mail fraud statute to act as a delegation of lawmaking power
to courts.
B. A Demonstration of the Diagnosis
This Part has maintained that courts misunderstand the
mail fraud statute. When asked to restrict it, they erroneously
adopt the role of agent, despite the fact that the statute delegates
lawmaking power to courts. This Section will attempt to demonstrate the accuracy of this diagnosis with United States v
Bryan.74
In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit found liability under the mail
fraud statute while rejecting the misappropriation theory of securities fraud-despite the fact that both statutes created uncertain liability. The court recognized that its ruling created inconsistency in the scope of federal fraud statutes, but was "not concerned" because it reasoned that fraud had different meanings in
different statutes.75
The Bryan court recognized that § 10(b) of the Securities Act
could accommodate misappropriation theory.7 Like the mail
fraud statute, § 10(b) and the corollary Rule 10b-5 are very
broad. As noted, statutes of such breadth effectively delegate
lawmaking power to courts. 77 The Bryan court observed that "the
language of the Rule, if not of the statute, could plausibly accommodate the misappropriation theory."78 It rejected misappropriation theory, however, because it believed that securities

Maze, 414 US at 405-06 (Burger dissenting). For another example of congressional
desire to maintain a broad mail fraud statute, see note 63.
' 58 F3d 933 (4th Cir 1995).
Id at 952.
Id at 945.
Commentators have noted that "when the statute and rule are [as vague as] § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 ...the law is surely as much judge-made as is the classic common law of
the state." Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, 7 Securities Regulation 3488-89 (Little, Brown
3d ed 1991). Judge Friendly identified § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as "significant steps toward
the development of a federal common law of corporate responsibility." Judge Henry J.
Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 NYU L Rev 383,
413-14 (1964).
' Bryan, 58 F3d at 945 (citations omitted). The sentence could be read to state that
the statute could not plausibly accommodate misappropriation theory. I think, however,
that the subsequent citations indicate that Judge Luttig meant that both could accommodate misappropriation theory.
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markets are fragile and such amorphous liability would be inappropriate.79
Despite the court's recognition of the power to control the
scope of § 10(b), it failed to see its concomitant power to control
the scope of the mail fraud statute. The court noted that "[miuch
of the conduct rendered criminal under the misappropriation
theory is already criminalized . . . under mail and wire fraud
statutes."0 If the court had understood that it had the power to
restrict the scope of the mail fraud statute, it seems likely that it
would have rejected criminal liability under the mail fraud statute for the very same reason it rejected misappropriation theory.
The "securities markets demand certainty," and amorphous
criminal liability-be it under § 10(b) or the mail fraud statutechills valuable conduct in the securities realm.
The Bryan court failed to see this because it too quickly assumed the role of an agent, merely complying with orders and
not concerning itself with inconsistencies in those orders. While
such concerns usually reside with the principal, in the case of the
mail fraud statute, Congress has enlisted the courts to step beyond the role of agent and exercise judgment. Were courts to recognize this fact, they would properly address questions such as
the inconsistency in rejecting misappropriation theory while convicting for mail fraud.
Having diagnosed the problems with the current approach to
the mail fraud statute, this Comment now turns to prescribing
the appropriate remedy. Repeal by implication, a tool of statutory
interpretation, solves the problem of schizophrenic treatment of
the mail fraud statute.
III. THE CASE FOR REPEAL BY IMPLICATION
Repeal by implication offers an effective tool to restrict the
mail fraud statute while preserving the statute's role as a gapfiller. This Part first explains why repeal by implication cures the
courts' schizophrenic treatment of the mail fraud statute. It then
turns to the caselaw to demonstrate that precedent offers some
support for the use of repeal by implication. Finally, it discusses
the problem of how to determine the scope of implicit repeal and

The court also relied heavily on Supreme Court precedent. Id. This precedent, how-

ever, is hardly dispositive on the issue, as the Supreme Court itself split on the question
of misappropriation theory under the Securities Act in a four-four vote. See Carpenterv
United States, 484 US 19, 24 (1987). The Fourth Circuit's choice of precedent, therefore,
reveals something of its belief as to the superior policy.
' Bryan, 58 F3d at 953.
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suggests that courts can solve this problem by tying the scope of
the implicit repeal to the scope of the statute.
A. Policy Arguments for Repeal by Implication
Repeal by implication is the best means of limiting the mail
fraud statute for four reasons. It lowers the cost to Congress of
enacting criminal legislation, restricts judicial and prosecutorial
discretion, improves notice, and preserves the gapfiller status of
the mail fraud statute.
1. Increasing Congress's power to shape criminal law.
Repeal by implication would increase the power of Congress
to shape the criminal law because it would lower Congress's cost
of signaling to courts its preference for implicit repeal, and enhance the legislative judgments embodied in statutory gaps.
Repeal by implication would reduce the cost of legislating
when measured against the unnecessary costs created by the
current approach to the mail fraud statute. The current approach
creates two such costs. Congress has to expend scarce resources
to consider and indicate when it does not want the mail fraud
statute to supplement a subsequent statute. This is expensive: so
expensive, in fact,8 ' it is likely that Congress does not even consider the issue in most cases. Of course, repeal by implication
would force Congress to indicate when it wants dual application.
Therefore, we can minimize the costs by adopting a presumption
that mirrors what Congress would want in the majority of
82
cases.
Congress would most likely prefer implicit repeal as a default rule in the case of specific criminal statutes. 8 Congress cre" See Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257, 267 (1974) ("[Llegislative production [is] an extremely expensive
form of production [of legal rules].").
' See id at 267-68 (As the amount and complexity of social activity increase over
time, we can expect to find that legislatures ... will delegate more and more of the legislative function... to executive and administrative agencies and courts-as has in fact
happened.").
Although no precedent on point exists, courts should also find implicit repeal in the
case of a subsequent, general statute. Consider securities fraud. A general provision such
as § 10(b) acts as a delegation to courts (or the SEC) to fashion law governing securities
fraud. When courts create gaps through their interpretations of this law, the mail fraud
statute should not fill those gaps. If courts think a gap should not exist, they can use
§ 10(b), the subsequent statute, to fill the gap. Such an approach would better serve the
value of notice by uniting all the relevant law on securities fraud under § 10(b) and related securities statutes, and consequently increase efficiency in criminal law by reducing
the number of applicable statutes. Moreover, while the principle of respecting congressional judgment no longer holds, there is no reason why courts should not respect their
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ates gaps in such statutes for one of two reasons. It may determine that the conduct does not warrant the use of federal resources. For example, the minimum of five thousand dollars in
the credit card fraud statute reflects a congressional judgment
that fraud below that amount is not worth pursuing.84 Alternatively, Congress-when legislating in a sensitive area-may
specify carefully what is illegal and what is not. This specification creates deliberate gaps in the statute. To fill these gaps
would undo Congress's careful specification, ultimately preventing Congress from implementing its judgments without the additional costly step of indicating that it does not want enforcement
by means of two statutes. This logic informed the Supreme
Court's ruling in Dowling v United States that the Court would
not "presume[ I congressional adoption of an indirect but blunderbuss solution to a problem treated with precision when considered directly [by Congress]. " 85 Under either rationale, assuming that Congress intends dual enforcement undermines the congressional judgment captured in the statutory gap and unnecessarily increases the cost of legislating.
In contrast, the argument that Congress prefers dual enforcement is far less persuasive. If Congress wanted federal
criminal law to apply, it would not take the costly step of creating a statutory gap. It defies reason to suggest that Congress
created a gap because it thought that the heavy-handed mail
fraud statute offered a better approach. Courts would minimize
the cost of lawmaking for Congress by adopting implicit repeal as
the default rule. 6
One objection to this argument for repeal by implication
comes from Justice Scalia. When he was a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Scalia argued that repeal by implication
own judgments. Outside of cases involving specific statutes where courts are merely legislative agents-a characterization that does not apply in the case of the mail fraud statute-it is hard to discern any principle supporting the lack of "concern[ ] with any inconsistency in the scope of fraud prohibited by... various statutes." Bryan, 58 F3d at 952.
"See text accompanying notes 34-38.
473 US 207, 226 (1985).
One might ask why Congress itself does not pass a repeal by implication bill detailing when courts should and should not implicitly repeal the mail fraud statute. Simply
put, lawmaking is very expensive for Congress, and such a law is not worth its time. See
Ehrlich and Posner, 3 J Legal Stud at 273-74 (cited in note 81) ("[T'he marginal cost of
statutory rules exceeds that of judge-made rules.... The greater costs of statutory rules
may also explain why such rules are generally more difficult to revise or modify than
judge-made rules."). The costs of such an endeavor would include surveying the criminal
code and deciding on a statute-by-statute basis whether or not the mail fraud statute
should be repealed in those areas. Even if Congress confined the bill to a presumption of
implicit repeal, the cost of legislating would probably not outweigh the benefits. In contrast, courts could very cheaply adopt this presumption.
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would make lawmaking too difficult for Congress because legislators would constantly be forced to guess how a current bill might
reshape existing law. We can understand this objection to be
saying that lawmaking is already expensive for Congress, and
repeal by implication could create huge additional costs by forcing Congress to gauge the impact of a new law on old ones. Two
responses defeat this objection. First, this Comment has already
shown that repeal by implication would likely reduce the cost of
lawmaking. Second, Scalia's point responds to an argument that
repeal by implication should apply generally. This Comment is
arguing for repeal by implication just in the case of mail fraud,
greatly diminishing any difficulty repeal by implication might
create for Congress.
2. Reducing judicial and prosecutorial discretion.
Repeal by implication would also limit judicial and prosecutorial discretion. This limitation would preserve their status as
subordinates to Congress in making law, as contemplated by the
Constitution."
Judged against the baseline of current law, repeal by implication would better limit judicial (and prosecutorial) discretion. A
court's ruling that the mail fraud statute is implicitly repealed
would bind or at least persuade future courts and prosecutors.
First, one has to consider the baseline against which one is
judging repeal by implication-the current approach, under
which courts and prosecutors already have substantial discretion. Judges exercise discretion in augmenting the scope of the
mail fraud statute. Courts have no explicit guidelines from Congress for deciding whether the mail fraud statute captures a new
form of illicit conduct.
Second, the Supreme Court's vacillation on the purpose requirement in the mail fraud statute creates discretion. 9 Under
the current approach, the caselaw gives courts unclear instructions regarding what satisfies the mailing element. Such a range
'

United States v Hansen, 772 F2d 940, 944 (DC Cir 1985) (Repeal by implication

would "distort[ ] [the legislative process] by a sort of blind gamesmanship, in which Members of Congress vote for or against a particular measure according to their varying estimations of whether its implications will be held to suspend the effects of an earlier law
that they favor or oppose."). See also Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand L Rev 561, 572-73
(1992) ("[A] busy Congress of limited prescience might fully support judicial use of this
canon [disfavoring repeals by implication], precisely to avoid the political embarrassment
of accidentally repealing desirable legislative provisions.").
US Const, Art I, § 1.
See text accompanying notes 33-44.
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of inconsistent choices permits courts to find liability case by
case, not on the basis of meaningful distinctions-such as
whether Congress intended to outlaw the conduct-but rather on
such considerations as whether distance or a slow postal system
caused a delay in the mailings.
In practice, courts consistently refuse to exercise their power
to limit the statute. This refusal shifts the discretion to prosecutors, who gladly accept this power. One Assistant United States
Attorney described "the mail fraud statute [as] our Stradivarius,
our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true
love.""0 Prosecutors inherit the power to shape the law by choosing whether to bring mail fraud charges to fill a statutory gap
created by Congress. This shift in the locus of discretion runs
counter to the notion of public accountability because a prosecutor's decisions are far less visible than a court's. We never know
when a prosecutor decides not to bring a charge of mail fraud.
In contrast, if a court ruled that a subsequent statute implicitly repealed the mail fraud statute, that decision would bind
future courts and prosecutors. This approach would limit their
discretion and force courts to make visible decisions as to the
scope of the mail fraud statute.
3. Rule of law.
There exists a "constitutional requirement of definiteness
[,which] is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplatedconduct is forbidden by [a] statute."9 ' Repeal by implication
would enhance notice by using subsequent statutes to carve out
pockets in the mail fraud statute. The subsequent statutes would
improve notice by alerting citizens to the federal treatment of
specific types of criminal conduct. For example, if the credit card
fraud statute implicitly repealed the mail fraud statute, citizens
would know that the federal government would not prosecute
such frauds below five thousand dollars. 2
The broad language of the mail fraud statute fails to identify
what conduct it outlaws. A defender of the current approach to
the statute might claim that the statute facially covers all situations, so notice is always given. He would maintain that the language is broad but not vague.9 3 In this case, however, the mail
Rakoff, 18 Duquesne L Rev at 771 (cited in note 63).
91

United States v Harris,347 US 612, 617 (1954).

See text accompanying notes 34-38.
See Maze, 414 US at 408 (White dissenting) (characterizing the mail fraud statute
as "an unambiguous federal criminal statute"). See also Dowling, 473 US at 232 (Powell
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fraud statute's breadth indicates vagueness. It requires only that
an individual lie in a letter in an attempt to get money or property. For example, suppose a boy away at camp lies to his mother
about winning the soccer match because he knows she will send
him a batch of cookies. While he has technically committed mail
fraud, no prosecutor would charge the child for lying to his
mother in a letter. Therefore, prosecutorial discretion effectively
makes the scope of the mail fraud statute ambiguous. Citizens
are thus left to guess what conduct the mail fraud statute actually prohibits.9 4
Courts might apply the rule of lenity to restrict the mail
fraud statute and give citizens better notice about the scope of
conduct that it covers, but the rule is too blunt an instrument to
restrain the mail fraud statute. For the rule of lenity to narrow a
statute, a court must be able to choose between two interpretations, one narrower than the other. Discerning a narrower interpretation of the mail fraud statute, however, requires a court to
devise a positive theory of mail fraud, which would limit the
statute's ability to cover emerging forms of fraud.95 Because the
rule of lenity thus would frustrate the mail fraud statute's gapfiller function, courts have been properly reluctant to apply it. 9"
Repeal by implication provides citizens with some notice but
in an unconventional way. Most statutes provide citizens with
notice by defining the scope of conduct that is prohibited. Repeal
by implication does not define the scope of prohibited conduct.
Instead, repeal by implication uses subsequent specific statutes
to define what conduct has not been outlawed.9 7
Although repeal by implication would better ensure notice, it
does not resolve the inherent tension between the mail fraud
statute and the rule of law. The role of the mail fraud statute as
a gapfiller alters the common law presumption that conduct is
legal unless the law clearly states otherwise, for its broad language effectively presumes that conduct is illegal. While the redissenting) ("As I read [the statute at hand], it is not ambiguous, but simply very broad.").
' See United States v McNeive, 536 F2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir 1976) ("Courts... have
been required to discern the purpose and reach of § 1341 from the broad, unqualified language of the statute itself [because of the lack of legislative history].") (citation omitted).
For a discussion of "positive theory," see note 13.
See Kahan, 1994 S Ct Rev at 346 (cited in note 16). There have been many recent
commentaries on the rule of lenity and its (non)application. See, for example, Ross E.
Davies, Comment, A Public Trust Exception to the Rule of Lenity, 63 U Chi L Rev 1175
(1996) (demonstrating the unstated exception to the rule of lenity in cases involving violations of the public trust); Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 197, 228 (1994) (calling for more consistent application of the rule of lenity).
s' For a discussion of how to define the scope of the repeal, see Part IlI.C.
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versal of this presumption seems to be an unfortunate, unavoidable byproduct of gapfillers, there is some evidence that courts
will recognize mistake of law defenses when the underlying conduct is not morally reprehensible." The next Section defends this
shift in presumption.
4. Retaining the flexibility of the statute.
Repeal by implication is superior to other attempts to limit
the mail fraud statute because it preserves the statute's role as a
gapfiller in two ways. First, repeal by implication lowers the cost
of outlawing illicit behavior. Second, it deters opportunistic
criminals from trying to find loopholes in statutes. 9
If one asks what the optimal distribution of criminal lawmaking power among the different branches is, the first argument for a gapfiller becomes clear. Lawmaking is very costly for
Congress. °0 By passing a broad statute, Congress has delegated
the responsibility of making law to a different institution, be it
the executive branch or the judiciary (for which the costs are
much lower).' ' Congress expresses a general purpose and relies
on one of the other branches to fill in the details.
The second reason for a gapfiller stems from the fact that
criminal conduct takes many forms. If Congress completely specified the scope of fraud, the criminal justice system would be unable to stop those who engage in illicit conduct without violating
the precise provisions of the law.0 2 By not specifying, Congress

See Michael L. Travers, Comment, Mistake of Law in Mala ProhibitaCrimes, 62 U
Chi L Rev 1301, 1303-16 (1995) (discussing cases allowing the mistake of law defense).
See also Kahan, 1994 S Ct Rev at 399-405 (cited in note 16) (arguing that broad statutes
do not heavily impinge on the value of notice).
One powerful yet intellectually unsatisfactory rationale is that we should simply
accept the existence of this gapfiller as a given, since we have long had it. The mail fraud
statute is over one hundred years old, and before that, courts used the generic crime of
fraud as a gapfller. Justice Story defined fraud as "all acts... which involve a breach of
legal or equitable duty... and [which] are injurious to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another." Story, 1 Equity Jurisprudence§ 186
at 190 (cited in note 6). Indeed, the history of the mail fraud statute shows that every
time the courts erect a limit to the scope of the statute, Congress removes the limitation.
See generally Rakoff, 18 Duquesne L Rev 771 (cited in note 63). But surely this assertion
does not satisfy. Gapfillers persist because there is good reason for them.
1
"See Kahan, 110 Harv L Rev at 474-75 (cited in note 9) (explaining that legislating is
extremely costly for Congress). See also Cohn S. Diver, The Optimal Precisionof Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L J 65, 103 (1983) (noting that high enforcement costs are external to the legislature, which "helps to explain why legislatures customarily use openended language to embody their substantive commands"); Ehrlich and Posner, 3 J Legal
Stud at 267-71 (cited in note 81) (identifying costs to making legal rules).
...
See Kahan, 110 Harv L Rev at 473-74 (cited in note 9).
" See note 63.
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encourages courts to adapt the mail fraud statute to reach such
opportunistic criminal behavior. This deliberate ambiguity
greatly reduces the cost of stopping illegal conduct and discourages criminals from attempting to shape their behavior to slip
through gaps in specified criminal law.
B. Repeal by Implication Under Current Law
Despite the harsh rhetoric of current law' and some hostile
precedents, °4 caselaw offers some support for repeal by implication.
Precedent strongly backs the proposition that a subsequent,
specific statute implicitly repeals a general, preceding statute.0 5
Courts find implicit repeal in such cases because the legislator
has directed her attention to the specific conduct at hand.0 6 This
"eSSeePosadas v National City Bank, 296 US 497, 503 (1936) ("[Riepeals by implication are disfavored."). See also Wood v United States, 41 US 342, 363 (1842) (There can be
repeal by implication only when there is "a positive repugnancy between the provisions of
the new law, and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication
only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."). At other times, the Court has proclaimed that the intent to repeal "must be clear and manifest." Red Rock v Henry, 106 US
596, 602 (1883). Such a requirement makes cases of repeal by implication a null set; the
term for "clear and manifest" intent is express. Note that the rhetoric of these cases is
more rigid than the reality of the caselaw.
"'The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected repeal by implication in the case of securities fraud. Edwards v United States, 312 US 473, 483-84 (1941) ("We see no basis for a
conclusion that Congress intended to repeal the [mail fraud] statute.").
c'The Supreme Court has recognized "[i]n a variety of contexts ... that a precisely
drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies." Brown v General Services
Administration,425 US 820, 834 (1976) (citations omitted). Indeed, some cases favor the
"principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one,
regardless of their temporal sequence." Busic v United States, 446 US 398, 406 (1980).
But see United States v Bennerson, 616 F Supp 167, 175 n 6 (S D NY 1985) (In Busic and
Simpson, the Supreme Court "relied... upon.., express indications in the legislative
history that the general statute was not to be applied when the specific statute was available."). The Court did use legislative history in Busic, but it also based its holding on
"relevant canons of statutory construction." Busic, 446 US at 404. Repeal by implication
was one of these "relevant canons."
Radzanower v Touche Ross & Co, 426 US 148, 153 (1976) (In such a case, the legislator has "focusfed] on the particularized problem[ ]."). Note that a subsequent general
statute will not preempt a prior specific statute. Id ("It is a basic principle of statutory
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not
submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum."). But the
case here is the converse. This Comment argues that a subsequent specific statute should
implicitly repeal a prior general statute. Indeed, one could enlist the argument for the
first proposition to make the case for the second. See also id at 159 n 2 (Stevens dissenting) (noting the general assumption that "[t]he legislature's attention was probably focused more directly on the subject matter of the specific than on only one aspect of a
much broader subject matter"). Independent of this observation, Justice Stevens seems to
favor case-by-case decisionmaking. He finds "abstract reasoning [I] less instructive than a
consideration of the source and the need for the alleged conflict." Id at 160. To decide the
particular case, "[oif special importance is an evaluation of the intent of Congress when it
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reasoning is consistent with this Comment's earlier discussion of
why Congress creates gaps in a subsequent statute."7 When enacting the subsequent statute, Congress focuses its attention and
makes refined judgments as to what conduct it does and does not
want outlawed. By filling these gaps with the mail fraud statute,

courts block that judgment.
Courts also recognize that finding implicit repeal serves the
value of notice. In one case, the Supreme Court explicitly linked
implicit repeal with the rule of lenity.' 5 As discussed above, in
the case of the mail fraud statute, repeal by implication would
actually serve the value of notice better than the (unapplied) rule
of lenity."°9 Unlike the rule of lenity, repeal by implication provides notice while at the same time preserving the mail fraud
statute as a gapfiller.
Some courts reject repeal by implication and argue that it is
inconsistent with congressional intent."' Such an argument is
misguided in the case of the mail fraud statute for two reasons.
First, one might respond that Congress never intended for the
mail fraud statute to cover the conduct at issue. Second, the focus
on intent relegates the court to the role of an obedient congressional agent rather than recognizing that Congress intended
courts to make law with the mail fraud statute."'

enacted the[ ] statutes." Id. What, then, is the intent of the mail fraud statute? If it simply is to act as a gapfiller, then repeal by implication is consistent with congressional intent, for there is no longer a gap to fill. It should also be noted that in Radzanower the
Supreme Court found no implicit repeal. Id at 155 (majority opinion). That fact should not
discount its characterization of the caselaw.
"' See text accompanying note 17.
"Simpson v United States, 435 US 6, 15-16 (1978) (This "principle is a corollary of
the rule of lenity, an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive."). While it is true that the Court noted favorable legislative history, it also stated that the "sparse," id at 15, legislative history was
"not dispositive," id at 13, on the issue. The Court later characterized its holding as resting upon "the legislative history and applicable canons of statutory construction," Busic,
446 US at 403, suggesting that repeal by implication may be employed as a tool of statutory interpretation.
"See text accompanying notes 91-97.

"See United States v Simon, 510 F Supp 232, 236-37 (E D Pa 1981) ("[Dlefendant has
failed to identify either language [in the statute] or any part of its legislative history
which would support [a finding of congressional intent to repeal]."). See also Bennerson,
616 F Supp at 175 n 6 (In cases where the Supreme Court found implicit repeal, "it relied
upon... express indications in the legislative history that the general statute was not to
be applied when the specific statute was available.") (citations omitted).
.See Part H.
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C. The Scope of the Implicit Repeal
For repeal by implication to work, courts must decide the extent to which a subsequent statute implicitly repeals the mail
fraud statute. To do so, courts should match the scope of the repeal to the scope of the subsequent statute.'
Matching implicit repeal to the scope of the subsequent statute does not mean that one should find implicit repeal only when
charges can be brought under another statute. The latter approach would swallow repeal by implication, as prosecutors could
always use the mail fraud statute to fill statutory gaps that prevented them from bringing charges. Take Maze as an example."'
In that case, the prosecutor could not bring a charge of credit
card fraud because the amount of money involved fell below the
minimum in the credit card statute."4 The mail fraud statute
should not apply, however, because Congress deliberately created
this gap in the statute.
To match the scope of implicit repeal to the scope of the subsequent statute, courts must first decide the scope of the subsequent statute. Guidelines in this endeavor are notably absent
from both caselaw and commentary." 5 This absence probably exists because formulating theoretical guidelines seems exceedingly

difficult.

116

The lack of theoretical guidance is not troublesome, however.
In practice courts are able to determine the scope of a statute to
their own satisfaction,"7 so determining the scope of repeal
"Under this rule, repeal by implication would actually have its greatest impact in
the case of such broad, general statutes as the Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1 et seq (1994),
and the National Stolen Property Act, 18 USC § 2314 (1994). These acts treat their respective areas comprehensively, obviating the need for the mail fraud statute to fill gaps.
" See text accompanying notes 33-42.
. See text accompanying note 36.
"See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 533 (1983)
( When does a court ... hold [a statute] inapplicable... ? This question has received almost no attention from courts or scholars."). See also Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, 90 Colum L Rev 277, 280-81 (1990) ("[Blow does one know when more than one law
may apply? Choice of law scholars have ignored this question."). This lacuna in choice of
law scholarship and caselaw probably exists because courts decide this question simply by
focusing on statutes invoked by the parties, an option unavailable in the criminal context.
See Easterbrook, 50 U Chi L Rev at 540.
.One might entertain healthy skepticism about whether courts will employ a commentator's theory for determining the applicability of a statute. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 Stan L Rev
321, 321-22 (1990) ("Judges' approaches to statutory interpretation are generally eclectic,
not inspired by any grand theory, and this is a good methodology.").
...
See Kramer, 90 Colum L Rev at 301 (cited in note 115) ("Experience demonstrates
that courts generally are able to determine the underlying purposes of laws based on language, structure, legislative history (if such history exists), and background."). This inquiry could legitimately entail analysis of legislative history. The criticism of courts that
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should also be fairly straightforward." 8 Federal statutes frequently identify the conduct they target, for example, the National Stolen Property Act". or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." ' Others will reach a particular type of conduct even

though they do not formally describe it. For example, the Sherman Act' 2 ' covers antitrust issues.'22
The example of bribery shows how this approach works.
Congress has specifically outlawed the bribery of grain inspectors
in two statutes.'2 Courts should refuse to use the mail fraud
statute to supplement the prosecution of a case involving the
bribery of a grain inspector because Congress has given the issue
its direct attention as shown by these two statutes. But for bribery of other officials, assuming that no other statute exists,
courts should use the mail fraud statute. There is no reason to
suppose that the two very narrow statutes governing grain inspectors act as the definitive treatment of all cases of bribery."
Of course, by the time a court takes into account all other subsequent statutes governing different kinds of bribery,121 the mail
fraud statute should have little to say on the subject.
Courts may disagree about which statutes implicitly repeal
the mail fraud statute. They will make arguments, often on policy grounds, but this outcome should not be worrisome. Courts
use legislative history to find no implicit repeal is not a criticism of using legislative history as such. The reproach is that courts asked the wrong question by focusing on intent
to repeal, which would require some kind of conscious reflection by Congress about the
interaction of the statute at hand and the mail fraud statute. That is different from asking whether a statute governs an area of conduct, which requires no thought whatsoever
by Congress regarding the mail fraud statute.
..See Kramer, 90 Colum L Rev at 301 (cited in note 115) ("[I]t is important not to
overstate the difficulty of determining a law's purpose.").
11918 USC § 2314 (1994).
15 USC §§ 78 et seq (1994).
12115 USC §§ 1 et seq (1994).
'In both cases, courts should strive to create uniformity, which will increase certainty in the federal criminal law. See Eben Moglen and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's
New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation,57 U Chi L Rev 1203,
1207 (1990) ('he interpretive community... is simply the social group whose shared
comprehension of a context makes possible the common interpretation of socially relevant
texts. The group element is absolutely necessary to the interpretive process.") (emphasis
added).
'See 7 USC § 85 (licensure and suspension of inspectors), 87b(a)(7) (prohibiting
bribery) (1994).
'For the sake of this example, this Comment ignores the multitude of other statutes
Congress has passed in this area. See, for example, 15 USC § 80b-3(e)(2)(a) (1994)
(bribery of investment advisers); 18 USC §§ 210-11 (1994) (bribery for the purpose of obtaining appointive office); 18 USC § 217 (1994) (bribery to adjust farm indebtedness). For
more examples, see Norman Abrams and Sara Sun Beale, Federal CriminalLaw and Its
Enforcement 225 n a (West 2d ed 1993).
1See note 124.
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will focus on and be restrained by subsequent statutes. Policy
may influence a court's decision about the scope of a subsequent
statute, but surely this is superior to focusing on irrelevant, hairsplitting questions, such as whether a delay in a mailing was
caused by the distance or the postal system.
Repeal by implication not only preserves the gapfiller attributes of the mail fraud statute, but also refines criminal law. It
lowers Congress's cost of creating statutory gaps, restricts judicial and prosecutorial discretion, and serves notice better than
the (unapplied) rule of lenity, all without undermining the gapfiller function.
CONCLUSION

The mail fraud statute plays an important role in federal
criminal law. Its broad scope enables it to reach novel forms of
fraud and stop opportunistic criminals. But the adaptability of
the mail fraud statute also enables prosecutors and courts to circumvent the subsequent enactments of Congress, and the statute's use runs counter to the principle of notice that underlies the
rule of law.
When asked to limit the mail fraud statute, courts mistakenly claim that they are simply Congress's agent. Yet their willingness to make law when expanding the statute reveals that the
mail fraud statute delegates lawmaking power to courts.
Moreover, by overturning McNally,2 ' Congress demonstrated
that it intends the mail fraud statute to act as a gapfller. Repeal
by implication offers a way to preserve the strength of the mail
fraud statute while mitigating its weaknesses. When Congress
passes a criminal statute governing particular conduct, the new
statute will implicitly repeal the mail fraud statute's coverage of
that conduct. Courts and prosecutors will then be forced to respect the subsequent enactment of Congress. But because repeal
by implication does not rely on a particular theory of fraud to
cabin the mail fraud statute, prosecutors will still have the
statute-their most effective weapon against novel crimes-at
their disposal.

483 US 350. See text accompanying notes 68-73.

